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At the beginning of 2014, the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsericht 
or BVG) referred a list of questions to the 
European Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling. These questions concern the legality of 
the decision of the European Central Bank 
(ECB) of 2012 establishing the mechanism of 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). 
Simultaneously, the BVG gave its own analysis 
on the main problems.1 In a nutshell, it 
considered that the mechanism was illegal for 
two main reasons. Firstly, it encroached on 
economic policy, which remains according to 
the EU Treaties a competence of the Member 
States. Secondly, it violated the prohibition of 
financing public deficits.2  
Most immediate comments were rather 
comforting after this decision. Most important 
of all, the financial markets did not budge. The 
investors seem to remain impressively 
unconcerned. But are they right? The answer 
could be yes in the short term and no in the long 
term. This question, however, is not easy, since 
this concerns a very specific domain of 
macroeconomic policy, which is also a very 
The German Constitutional Court 
(BVG) recently referred different 
questions to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling. They 
concern the legality of the European 
Central Bank’s Outright Monetary 
Transaction mechanism created in 2012. 
Simultaneously, the German Court has 
threatened to disrupt the 
implementation of OTM in Germany if 
its very restrictive analysis is not 
validated by the European Court of 
Justice. 
 
This raises fundamental questions 
about the future efficiency of the ECB’s 
monetary policy, the damage to the 
independence of the ECB, the balance 
of power between judges and political 
organs in charge of economic policy, in 
Germany and in Europe, and finally the 
relationship between the BVG and other 
national or European courts. 
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specific area of EU law, and even of law in 
general.  
MACROECONOMIC POLICY AS A SPECIFIC 
DOMAIN OF LAW 
The concept of macroeconomic policy regroups 
basically budgetary (or fiscal) policy on one side, 
and monetary policy. Both instruments 
developed progressively throughout the 20th 
century, and especially after the Great 
Depression.3 Legally speaking, macroeconomic 
policy has always been one quite special area of 
public law. Budgetary policy was – and remains 
– mainly the responsibility of the executive and 
legislative powers. The authorisation of 
spending belongs to the legislative. The 
execution of spending belongs to the executive. 
The control of budget execution is generally 
trusted to a court of auditors, which depends on 
the legislative assemblies. There exist thus very 
few judicial decisions about budgetary policy in 
all developed countries. Judges are meant to 
show some restraint in that field, in view of the 
need to preserve the balance of powers. This is 
still more the case for monetary policy.  
MONETARY POLICY AS A VERY SPECIFIC 
DOMAIN OF LAW 
Since the creation of the Bank of England at the 
end of the 17th century, the first function of the 
central banks has been the lending of money to 
financial intermediates in case of crisis. They 
played the role of the lender of last resort. They 
lent in a context of financial hysteria, to put a 
floor under the destruction of financial assets.4 
Later, this role developed into the managing of 
the monetary creation of the banking system 
through the use of interest rates. Central banks 
were generally private organs, which 
progressively became public ones. More 
recently, since the great inflation surge of the 
1970s, they have tended to be more independent 
(though there remain huge variations between, 
for example the USA, Japan, the UK, and the 
EU).  
Legally speaking, monetary policy has always 
been one extremely special area of public law. 
Financial markets have two characteristics. 
Firstly, they are always intensely innovative, 
since this allows the creation of more wealth 
(sometimes quite artificially, as we still re-
discovered in 2008). Secondly, they are often 
unstable, oscillating from ungrounded 
exuberance to excessive fears (as we also re-
discovered in 2008). That’s why they need both 
regulation, and salvation lending (accompanied 
by restructuration) each time regulation fails. 
This tends to happen quite regularly, because of 
their permanent innovation compulsion.  
Legally, these characteristics have huge 
implications. To begin with, since there are 
always new financial innovations, one cannot 
anticipate all of them with precision in a legal 
text. The reading of C. Kindleberger’s 
masterpiece, Manias, panics and crashes, says it all.5 
“Central banks typically have rules. Where these 
cannot be broken… there is frequently trouble”. 
(…) “The rule is that there is no rule”. (…) 
“There are times when rules and precedents 
cannot be broken; others when they cannot be 
adhered to with safety”.6  
Additionally, if one wants to stabilise markets, 
the volume of salvation measures cannot be 
limited in advance. In the middle of the 2008 
meltdown, it would have been impossible for 
the central banks to say: “we are going to lend, 
but within the limit of 200 billion dollars”. 
Automatically, financial institutions would have 
kept on rushing for the nearest exit. Famously, 
M. Friedman quipped once that the extreme 
price deflation could be fought by "dropping 
money out of a helicopter".7 This quip became 
nearly official policy after 2008. Ben Bernanke, 
after the very impressive (and successful) 
monetary expansion he launched at the 
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American Federal reserve, became “helicopter 
Ben”.  
These features make it impossible for the law to 
restrict in advance the precise form of central 
banks’ interventions. So it defines general 
objectives, whose respect is very difficult to 
control through the classical judicial means, not 
only because the objectives are very general, but 
because the technical instruments are quite 
complex. So in fact there is more or less no 
caselaw about this topic in most States 
(including in Germany). This limited control is 
compounded by a third reason, being that 
central banks are meant to possess some strong 
independence in the exercise of their main 
functions.  
THE GREAT MAASTRICHT INNOVATION 
OF MONETARY POLICY ORGANISED BY A 
TREATY 
In this field, the EU has introduced an 
enormous innovation with the Maastricht 
Treaty. From this point of view, the euro is a 
project without any precedent. More precisely, 
the treaty has established a central bank whose 
legal statute is defined by an international law 
instrument, and not a national one. There had 
been treaties organising the cooperation of 
national monetary authorities, like the statute of 
the International Monetary Fund, but 
establishing a single international monetary 
authority to manage a continental reserve 
currency, is something much more ambitious.  
The institutional setting of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) is quite complex. It 
encompasses a European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB), and the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The objectives, classically, are quite 
general. According to article 282(2) TFEU, “the 
primary objective of the ESCB shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to 
that objective, it shall support the general 
economic policies in the Union in order to 
contribute to the achievement of the latter’s 
objectives”. As the need of trust, and thus 
certainty, is paramount in the financial markets, 
the monetary competence of the EU in this 
framework has been made exclusive. The 
national banks of the Eurosystem are execution 
agents. They follow the instructions of the ECB. 
Otherwise, functionally, there can be no 
monetary policy.  
The independence of the ECB has also been 
protected in a very strong way.8 As the 
European Court of Justice has emphasised in 
2003 in a landmark case, this independence is 
however not always absolute,9 but it is in the 
field of its tasks.  
THE OMT FEATURES  
The OMT program was launched by the ECB in 
2012 in the midst of an acute crisis of 
confidence in the Euro. At the time, the threat 
of a possible exit from Greece had slightly 
receded. However, the interest rates on the 
public debt of the peripheral Member States 
were steadily increasing, associated with growing 
threats concerning the solvability of peripheral 
banks. In June 2012, the Euro area summit 
decided to take measures “to break the vicious 
circle between banks and sovereigns”.10 In July 
2012, President Draghi made famously clear the 
full determination of the ECB: “within our 
mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it 
will be enough”.11 In August 2012, the ECB 
decided to launch the OMT.  
From the reading of the press release, one is 
immediately struck by the high level of 
conditionality surrounding this new 
instrument.12 All Member States covered must 
follow some kind of adjustment programme.13 
This is definitely no helicopter money. This high 
level of conditionality has even been criticised in 
some quarters. As an instrument for the 
management of a deep and urgent crisis, 
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entering into a discussion for the adoption of an 
adjustment programme is not precisely the basis 
of a rapid strategy.  
However, the simple announcement was 
sufficient in itself to calm the financial markets. 
During summer 2012, they were going through a 
real spasm. “The situation in the eurozone was 
dramatic before the announcement of the OMT 
programme. Nominal interest rates had hugely 
diverged, banks’ access to finance was severely 
hampered, and the eurozone’s financial system 
was deeply fragmented. Changes in the 
monetary policy stance of the ECB were not 
transmitted throughout all the Eurozone and the 
ECB was therefore not able to fulfill its mandate 
of ensuring the proper conduct of monetary 
policy in the Eurozone”.14 
The programme was quickly productive. As the 
IMF noted in its second 2012 Outlook, “OMTs, 
which the ECB will consider for countries under 
a macroeconomic adjustment or precautionary 
program with the European Financial Stability 
Facility and its successor, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), should help ensure that low 
policy rates transmit to borrowing costs in 
countries in the periphery with a program”.15 
The calm came back on the markets without any 
beginning of implementation. This tends to 
indicate that there was a real aberration of the 
financial markets in summer 2012, and that the 
measure was precisely adequate and balanced. 
Moreover, the programme did not cost one 
cent, and even brought money to all the Euro 
area Members.16  
THE BVG’S DECISION 
In a nutshell, the most important part of the 
BVG’s decision consists in referring some 
questions regarding the OMT’s respect of the 
European Union Treaty to the European Court 
of Justice. In the same breath however, the 
BVG already provides the answer, meaning that 
the OMT is invalid unless it is constrained by 
very strong and multiple limits, enumerated by 
the judgment. 
According to § 55 of the judgment, “subject to 
the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the Federal Constitutional 
Court considers the OMT Decision 
incompatible with Art. 119 and Art. 127 sec. 1 
and 2 TFEU and Art. 17 et seq. of the ESCB 
Statute because it exceeds the mandate of the 
European Central Bank that is regulated in these 
provisions and encroaches upon the 
responsibility of the Member States for 
economic policy. It also appears to be 
incompatible with the prohibition of monetary 
financing of the budget enshrined in Art. 123 
TFEU. The European Central Bank’s reference 
to a “disruption to the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism” is not likely to change 
the assessment of these two points. Accordingly, 
the applications would probably be successful. 
Another assessment could, however, be 
warranted if the OMT Decision could be 
interpreted in conformity with primary law.” 
According to the BVG, the ECB has 
transgressed its own mandate. Revealingly, the 
BVG then begins some very amateuristic course 
in monetary economics.17 For example, the ECB 
has taken bad (according to the BVG) monetary 
measures. “The constitutional justification of the 
independence of the European Central Bank is, 
however, limited to a primarily stability-oriented 
monetary policy” (§ 59). Any monetary measure 
deemed by the BVG not to be “primarily 
stability-oriented” is unconstitutional. “What is 
relevant is not only the objective, but also the 
instruments used for reaching the objective and 
their effects. (…) To the degree that the 
European System of Central Banks thus grants 
financial assistance, it pursues an economic 
policy that the European Union is prohibited 
from conducting” (§ 65).  
Additionally, the simple reference to the Euro 
area instruments EFSM and ESM ipso facto 
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transforms the OMT into a budgetary measure. 
“By tying the purchase of government bonds of 
selected Member States to full compliance with 
the requirements of the assistance programmes 
of the European Financial Stability Facility and 
the European Stability Mechanism and thus 
retaining its own conscientious examination, the 
European Central Bank makes the purchase of 
government bonds on the basis of the OMT 
Decision an instrument of economic policy” (§ 
77).  
These concerns could however be met if the 
European Court of Justice makes “an 
interpretation in conformity with EU law” (§ 
99). This means in reality “in conformity with 
the exclusive authentic interpretation of EU law 
given by the BVG”. Should this not happen, 
“German authorities may not take part in the 
decision making process and the 
implementation of ultra vires acts and are not 
entitled to participate in measures affecting the 
constitutional identity protected by Art. 79 sec. 3 
GG. This applies to all constitutional organs, 
authorities and courts” (§ 30).  
Such an approach provokes (at least) four 
fundamental questions. The first one concerns 
the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary 
measures, the second one the possible damage 
to the independence of the ECB, the third one 
the balance of power between the constitutional 
judges and the legitimate political organs in 
charge of economic policy, in Germany and in 
Europe, and the fourth one the relationship 
between the BVG and other national or 
European courts.  
A THREAT TO THE GENERAL EFFICIENCY 
OF THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICY 
The 2014 decision makes little analysis of the 
crisis context of 2012. Germany’s constitutional 
judges seem to live in a far, far away galaxy from 
the financial reality. Though this seems hard to 
believe at such a level of responsibility, the 
economic line of reasoning is largely limited to 
an incredibly simplistic argument, that buying 
any State bond automatically provokes monetary 
financing of the budget.  
Better yet, absolutely no value is recognised to 
the ECB’s analysis of the situation. “The fact 
that the purchase of government bonds can, 
under certain conditions, help to support the 
monetary policy objectives of the European 
System of Central Banks does not turn the 
OMT Decision itself into an act of monetary 
policy. (…) The (economic) accuracy or 
plausibility of the reasons for the OMT 
Decision are irrelevant in this respect” (§ 96). 
Surprisingly, this strong affirmation does not 
prevent the BVG from offering immediately its 
own vision of the functioning of the financial 
markets, of course infinitely more intelligent 
than the ECB’s. “It seems irrelevant in this 
regard that the European Central Bank only 
intends to assume a disruption to the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism if the amount of 
the refinancing interest of a Member State of the 
euro currency area were “irrational”. Spreads 
always only result from the market participants’ 
expectations and are, regardless of their 
rationality, essential for market-based pricing. 
To single out and neutralise supposedly 
identifiable individual causes would be 
tantamount to an arbitrary interference with 
market activity. Ultimately, the distinction 
between rational and irrational is meaningless in 
this context and can in any case not be 
operationalised” (§ 98).18 
This substitution of the BVG to the ECB could 
provoke enormous consequences. Firstly, if all 
monetary measures taken in a context of crisis 
are contested and analysed this way, there can be 
at the end no stabilisation of financial crises, and 
no monetary policy. Secondly, this example 
could rapidly result into multiple contestations 
of the ECB’s independence, from various judges 
and various Member States. Thirdly, “the not-
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insignificant issue of the limits to quantitative 
easing created by the [BVG] decision could be in 
focus if the Euro area settles in a deflationary 
trap. (…) Buying government bonds is… the 
most efficient form of quantitative easing”.19  
In 2013, a call of support for the OMT was 
launched, and signed by hundreds of world 
economists to underline the risks of such a 
summary judicial approach.20 It underlined both 
the efficiency and the legitimacy of the ECB’s 
strategy. “The announcement of the OMT 
programme in the summer of 2012 is one of the 
most skilful and successful monetary policy 
communications in decades. Without spending a 
single euro, the ECB has succeeded to enhance 
liquidity, to prevent a bank run, to reduce 
uncertainty and volatility in financial markets, to 
lower borrowing costs for sovereigns, banks and 
corporations (in particular in its most vulnerable 
countries), and to improve confidence and trust 
in the sustainability of the euro and the 
prospects of the euro area economy. These 
effects of the OMT announcement have 
benefited not only the most vulnerable countries 
of the euro area, but all European countries, 
including Germany. Indeed, the success of the 
OMT announcement proves that the OMT is 
primarily a monetary policy instrument. The 
effects of the announcement of the OMT 
programme show that liquidity risk premia and 
an unjustified exchange rate risk did exist in euro 
area markets in the summer of 2012. Hence the 
ECB’s justification of the OMT programme to 
address such risk premia, but not solvency risk 
of sovereigns in the euro area, is supported by 
the evidence over the past year”.21 
To put it in a more technical way, “both a 
cursory and a deep reading of Article 123 TFEU 
make it clear that the article says nothing about 
monetary financing. Monetary financing 
concerns the liability side of the balance sheet of 
the central bank. Article 123 TFEU exclusively 
puts restrictions on the asset side of the balance 
sheet of the central bank. It bans overdraft 
facilities or any other type of credit facility with 
the ECB or the NCBs for any member state 
government institution and for Union 
institutions and direct purchases of government 
debt by the ECB and NCBs. This suggests the 
desirability of Basic Law and TFEU 
amendments banning bodies that don’t know 
debit from credit to rule on matters that depend 
crucially on that distinction”.22 One could add 
that there is nothing to indicate that the ECB’s 
stability mandate does not cover all prices, 
including those of financial assets if they 
become manifestly erratic in a context of 
financial hysteria.  
To conclude, this brings a result without any 
precedent in the history of monetary policy. 
“The ECB is not in court because of monetary 
financing, but rather as a lender of last resort. 
Accordingly, a court decision against the OMT 
would endorse an economic reasoning which 
contradicts 150 years of modern central bank 
history and would expose the euro area to the 
instabilities of financial markets. Such a 
monetary union is neither sustainable nor 
desirable”.23 Very simply, had such an approach 
been followed by the central banks in 2008, 
there would not be financial markets any more.  
A THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF 
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
From the beginning of the negotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the independence of the 
European Central Bank has always been 
considered a fundamental pillar of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU). It is necessary to 
protect monetary policy from the pressures of 
various political authorities or interested parties.  
From this point of view, the BVG’s approach 
generates different problems. The intervention 
of a national authority in such a debate is liable 
to unbalance monetary policy. More 
fundamentally, this type of debate can create a 
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general feeling of uncertainty in the financial 
markets. There are presently 18 Member States 
in the eurozone, and thus more or less 18 
Constitutional courts. What will happen if each 
European monetary instrument begins to be 
contested during months and years before 
different national courts? In truth, monetary 
policy becomes impossible.24  
Furthermore, from this point of view, the 
decision seems very strongly inspired by the 
Bundesbank’s reasoning. The exclusive use of a 
national central bank’s analysis to interpret EU 
law, while criticising repeatedly the EU central 
bank, reflects an unwelcome bias.25  
More directly yet, this nationalist streak is 
compounded by the repeated criticism of any 
selectivity. The fact that the OMT targets the 
bonds of some Member States is invoked as a 
proof that it is no monetary measure. “Because 
the OMT Decision envisages a targeted 
purchase of government bonds of selected 
Member States, however, the spreads on 
government bonds issued by these states are 
levelled by changes in market conditions, and 
the government bonds of other Member States 
are eventually placed at a disadvantage” (§ 73). 
So, potentially, other crisis measures benefiting 
more some specific Member States, even based 
on fully objective criteria, could suffer the same 
fate.  
By doing so the BVG clearly contributes to the 
growing “germanisation” of the general 
management of the Euro area. Additionally, it 
reinforces its dual evolution mixing stronger 
federal control brakes and weaker 
intergovernmental accelerators, leading to an 
increasingly imbalanced institutional structure. 
As a consequence, the macroeconomic policy 
mix is much more restrictive in the euro area 
than in other developed countries, as any quick 
comparison reveals (with the foreseeable 
negative impact regarding growth and 
unemployment).  
How would the BVG react, for example, if the 
Spanish constitutional council decided that the 
ECB’s monetary policy is too restrictive to 
protect the stability of the economy, thus 
contrary to the treaty, and used the threat of 
disobedience of the Spanish authorities to 
impose its own interpretation ? Or forbade for 
the same reason the Spanish financial 
institutions to pay any debt to external creditors? 
The answer is easy to imagine.  
This leads to a manifest decline of the ECB’s 
independence. Revealingly, some ECB 
members’ speeches acknowledge simply that its 
inaction is at least partly justified by political 
considerations.26 “The fact that a member of the 
ECB Executive Board cites political problems as 
a reason not to ease is a clear example of the 
increased politicization and diminished 
independence of the ECB and the 
disinflationary pressure that this generates.”27 
A THREAT TO THE BALANCE OF POWER 
BETWEEN POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITIES 
The OMT concept is already strongly 
conditional. Among these conditions one finds 
the need of an adjustment programme, thus 
negotiated between the assisted Member State, 
the European institutions and (most probably) 
the International Monetary Fund. This as a 
matter of fact has happened repeatedly during 
the last five years. There is no lack of 
democratic control, especially in Germany. So 
the German government, especially the Prime 
minister and the Minister of Finance, spend 
much time in the Bundestag before and after 
any European council.  
Through its decision, the BVG thus intervenes 
in fact also in the domain of economic policy, 
where the political organs this time have a 
classical legitimacy. It considers in principle that 
per se the OMT is unconstitutional, since it is 
linked to economic policy (as any intelligent 
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monetary action is). Such a control could be 
legitimate in case of a “manifest violation”, as 
the BVG decision emphasises. This is however 
quite difficult to establish here, especially when 
so many institutions and specialists from so 
many countries and disciplines explain the 
contrary. Such a situation certainly does not 
warrant the intervention of constitutional judges 
in all aspects of macroeconomic policy. This 
goes clearly against the principle of judicial 
restraint (and was emphasised by the BVG 
dissenting judges). The protection of checks and 
balances imposes restraint to all constitutional 
authorities. This is clearly not the BVG’s 
approach here. The problem does not concern 
only the relation between the judicial and the 
democratically elected powers in Germany, but 
also in the whole European Union.  
Additionally, this reduces the efficiency of the 
whole Euro area macroeconomic policy. During 
the last twenty years, torrents of comments have 
criticised the disconnection between monetary 
policy and economic policy established in the 
Maastricht Treaty. To be efficient, 
macroeconomic policy requires precisely some 
connection between these two components. 
Otherwise, there are serious risks of incoherence 
and expensive confusion.28 From the 1999 
German presidency onwards, the European 
Council has tried to correct this weakness. The 
OMT was precisely an original progress in that 
direction. The BVG goes precisely into the 
opposite one, since it considers that monetary 
measures conditioned to the implementation of 
economic programmes must be considered as an 
abuse of power.  
To conclude, the BVG decision “is a friendly 
gloss on the quest to be the ultimate power in 
the Euro’s survival”.29 Unfortunately, this 
blatant power grab is made by taking hostage 
the financial stability of the whole European 
Union. In case of a new crisis, the damage could 
be colossal.  
A THREAT TO THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 
Finally, one must underline the very bizarre 
approach of the BVG’s decision regarding its 
relationship with the European Court of 
Justice… and the other national courts. 
Basically, for an external observer, this looks a 
lot like some kind of judicial blackmail. “I 
consider that the OMT is a violation of the 
Treaty. This decision allows me to provoke 
chaos in various ways for its implementation in 
Germany. However, I could change my 
conclusion if you decided that OMT is 
conditioned by the elements that I enumerate 
below. You know what you have to do.”  
The European Court of Justice has been created 
to protect the rule of law, in a vision balancing 
the interests of all its Member States. If all 
supreme courts in the 28 Member States begin 
to use the same strategy, and condition their 
implementation of EU law to the respect of 
their own interpretation, there can be at the end 
no European Union. The BVG’s approach 
could thus raise questions regarding the 
principles of equality between Member States 
and of sincere cooperation between the Union 
and the Member States. How would the BVG 
react, for example, if the French constitutional 
council referred a question to the European 
Court of Justice in the same way? “I believe that 
the Reach decision authorising some chemical 
substances used in big (German) cars is a 
violation of the Treaty. I will thus authorise the 
French authorities to disregard EU rules and 
forbid these products. However, I could change 
my conclusion if you decided that these 
substances must respect different additional 
conditions. You know what you have to do.” 
CONCLUSION 
Using a bizarre methodology, the BVG’s 2014 
decision is somewhat final without being 
completely final. So this is not the (complete) 
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end of the story. However, by the multiple 
systemic questions it raises, it will already have 
important consequences, short term and long 
term. At the end, its rationale is crystal clear. To 
summarise, neither the European Central Bank 
nor the International Monetary Fund do 
understand what monetary policy is, hundreds 
of world recognised specialists in the field do 
not understand it either, political representatives 
have no serious things to say in the field of 
economic policy, other national constitutional 
judges have nothing to bring in this debate, and 
the European Court of Justice’s judges are just 
good enough to repeat what they are told. Only 
the German constitutional judges know all the 
answers. Though it is saddening to reach such a 
conclusion, from whatever angle one chooses to 
look at it, one can only conclude that this 
decision is a masterpiece of judicial arrogance, 
written by people who care very little about the 
essential common interests each of us should 
strive to protect. “Humility is truth” (Erasmus). 
The authors are retired diplomat, professor 
and public servant. 
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